Abstract-Variable renewable generation is increasing in penetration in modern power systems, leading to higher variability in the supply and price of electricity as well as lower average spot prices. This raises new challenges, particularly in ensuring sufficient capacity and flexibility from conventional technologies. As the fixed costs and lifetimes of electricity generation investments are significant, designing markets and regulations which ensure efficient integration of renewable generation is a significant challenge. This panel presentation reviews the state of play in the USA and Europe with regard to these issues and considers new developments in both regions.
INTRODUCTION
Power systems have changed considerably in recent years. Liberalization of electricity markets has taken place on many systems, particularly in the USA and Europe. Concerns about climate change and energy security have led to a policy shift from fossil fuels towards variable renewable generation (VG), particularly wind and photovoltaics. These generation sources differ from conventional generation in terms of the variability and limited predictability of their output, their high capital costs and negligible operating costs and the impact of geographic location on their output. Thus market mechanisms which were designed to ensure efficient investment and operation of conventional generation may not prove efficient in integrating renewable generation. Difficulties include ensuring revenue adequacy for all market participants in markets with depressed spot prices, market scheduling, particularly between interconnected markets, and ensuring efficient transmission investment and operation. The low operating costs of renewable generation, along with nuclear, hydro and CHP generation, spot prices are depressed and energy-only markets are unlikely to provide sufficient investment incentive. These challenges have seen varied responses from system operators and regulators through both market and regulatory mechanisms. This panel presentation examines the implications of these challenges which are currently seen in modern power systems. The response from regulators and policy makers, with a focus on late-breaking work in these areas from both the USA and Europe, is examined.
II. MARKET CHALLENGES FROM VARIABLE GENERATION
Increased variable and limited predictable renewable generation places new requirements on power system operation and electricity markets. Variability and uncertainty means more flexibility will be needed. Increased amounts of variable generation also displace fossil fuel use and mean less operating hours for conventional generation -as well as decreased electricity prices during hours of high renewable generation.
A. Requirements for flexibility
Variable renewable generation (VG) leads to higher variability in residual demand, which is given by demand minus renewable generation. This residual demand must be met by conventional generation units. At moderate VG penetration levels the mid merit power plants will see the task of operating in a more flexible way. At high penetration levels base load operation will also be impacted.
There is significant interest in developing methods for assessing the flexibility need and characteristics of the power system [1] . Installing sufficient flexibility in the power system, however, is not a sufficient condition for making that flexibility available when needed. Appropriate mechanisms are also required to allow system operators to obtain those services when necessary in order to maintain system balance. Existing market regulations and designs may not incorporate sufficient incentives and rewards for flexibility which will be required in order to ensure both efficient system operation and renewable.
Obtaining deployable flexibility has two components: (1) the economically efficient level of investment in flexible technologies must take place and (2) once installed, price signals or regulatory requirements must incentivize generators to make these flexible capabilities available to the system operator. As variable renewable penetration increases, flexible units may be operated in a manner which sees their capacity factors and their online durations reduced relative to those of baseload units, which in turn reduces their revenues. An energy-only market, where remuneration is awarded for energy provision only and not performance, may therefore penalize flexible units. Furthermore, flexible units are also more likely to serve as the marginal unit and so cannot gain inframarginal rent during the hours that it sets the market price. Regulatory measures designed to limit scarcity pricing, such as price caps, can exacerbate this problem. Reduced spot prices from technologies with low marginal costs reduce returns for conventional generators even further. Thus there is cause for concern that traditional energy-only markets may lead to revenue inadequacy for conventional units and will also penalize flexible units. An energy only market with shortperiod trading only can be found in Australia (5-min real time market with a very high price cap). This design was presented in 0 mitigating some of the above mentioned challenges.
B. Revenue and price impacts of wind penetration
Various studies have been conducted regarding the impacts of renewable generation on both electricity prices and on the revenue all types of generators can expect to earn. Renewable electricity is understood to reduce prices through the merit order effect whereby renewable electricity is regarded as low short-term-marginal-cost generators. Thus the supply curve is shifted to the right and intersects the demand curve, which is fixed, at a lower point, leading to lower prices. In the longer term, as old generation is retired and consumption may increase, the price curves will again cross on average at higher level, but with increased volatility. In Europe, several ex-post analyses have found that wind penetration leads to lower wholesale prices, with the reduction in prices greater than the subsidy mechanisms awarded to renewable generation [3] [4] [5] [6] . In [7] it is found that the impact of increased wind generation on system balancing costs is much lower than estimated wind integration costs.
In the United States there has been concern regarding revenue adequacy even without significant VG. For example New York (NYISO), which has a relatively small amount of wind energy, experienced prices below the cost of new entry in 2011 and 2012 according to a recent market report [8] . Market prices are coupled with both the dispatch stack and transmission constraints. In the U.S. there have been cases of curtailment of wind power that are done outside of the market construct, resulting in uneconomic outcomes [9] . These occur generally during periods of low demand, high wind output, and with other generation constrained at minimum output. Several market areas in the U.S. now do some form of economic dispatch on wind plants so that the impact on low/negative market prices is mitigated [10] . In European countries with high wind penetration negative market price signals are used to incentivize the downward-dispatch of lowmarginal cost units. The use of new forms of demand is also incentivized this way, e.g. heat boilers in the district heating system. When neighboring markets do not have synchronized price floors, the phenomenon of bids being cut in one market with energy being imported into the same market and negative prices on both sides of the border can be observed [9] .
III. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT MARKET STRUCTURES
Market designs in Europe and the USA vary considerably, both between the two continents and between different markets and systems within each continent. The European Directive 2009/72/EC [11] requires member states to adapt their national laws, making countries move towards a common Internal Electricity Market (IEM) to be finalized by 2014. Among the objectives increased market coupling between different regions via interconnectors is required. Markets in the USA must comply with regulatory orders set by the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC). When considering renewable integration, of particular interest are day ahead and intra-day markets, capacity payment mechanisms and locational versus zonal marginal pricing..
A. Day ahead and intra-day markets
Future very high penetration levels of low short-termmarginal-cost units can change energy only markets profoundly. For example the Nordic market, which is hydro dominated, needs conventional generation to set prices, as well as to optimize the use of water. Adding VG to this system will push conventional generation out with only biomass fueled combined heat and power remaining.
Many current power market structures have a day-ahead market closing approximately 12-36 hours before the real time operation. The day-ahead market creates the first committed schedule. As the hour of operation gets closer, forecasts improve and intra-day markets can then be used to provide updated market positions. For example, the Nordic power system has a continuous intra-day market, which closes one hour before the operating hour while the Spanish market has six intra-day market sessions. The previous results in a shorter gate closure while the latter creates more liquidity. Finally, the TSO manages the power system in real time with the help of ancillary service markets and reserves.
The proposed IEM requires harmonized trade over interconnectors which should lead to a zonal market structure. Each balance responsible party is required to combine price and quantity pairs and submit these pairings to a power exchange which will in turn determine efficient interconnector flows on that basis. Further intraday trading then takes place within the market zones with implicit trading between market zones, There is room for discretion on how each system arrives at its price-quantity pairs, whether through bilateral trading, centralized dispatch, or some combination of the two.
B. Capacity payment mechanisms
Capacity payment mechanisms are mechanisms whereby units receive payments on the basis of their capacity and/or availability. Capacity payments are used as a means of responding to the 'missing money' problem of revenue inadequacy as outlined in Section II. In Europe in general two groups of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRM) are discussed: volume based versus price based mechanisms. Volume based mechanisms can be targeted (strategic reserve) or market wide (capacity obligations, capacity auctions or reliability options). The most important requirement is to serve the purpose of ensuring generation adequacy without causing distortion to the market. An analysis of the challenges with respect to the different mechanisms has been made by ACER [12] .
Experience with capacity payments to date is mixed. The Single Electricity Market in Ireland has had a capacity payment mechanism in place since 2007. Ireland currently has capacity which far exceeds peak demand but as this is due at least in part to a collapse in demand since 2008 it is difficult to determine whether the structure of the capacity payment mechanism is overly generous. The British market BETTA is currently an energy-only market based on bilateral trading but is introducing a capacity payment mechanism as prices have been below the long-run average cost [13] and so new capacity has not been forthcoming and a capacity crunch is foreseen. The Nordic market is energy-only based, but each member country has some mechanism to ensure capacity adequacy, e.g. in Finland some old units receive capacity reserve payments to keep them from being dismantled. There are strategic reserves in Sweden [14] and different types of TSO capacity responsibilities in Denmark and Norway. However, both Norway and Sweden are heavily dependent on comparatively high MC units in neighboring countries. With discussions on more low MC units and price-decreasing capacity markets in neighboring countries, there is a concern regardingensuring pricesare high enough to cover the costs of all units.
The implementation of the IEM has to date concerned itself with market coupling and capacity allocation across interconnectors. However capacity remuneration mechanisms, both existing and proposed, in various EU markets have led the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to voice opinions on capacity markets [12] , [15] . While not explicitly recommending against capacity payments ACER maintains that removing barriers to trade such as price caps and concessions granted to renewable generators may remove the need for capacity payments. Furthermore ACER insists that market integration is the priority and capacity payments should not distort incentives or trade nor should they cause discrepancies between systems.
The U.S. market areas that have capacity markets include NYISO, ISONE, and PJM. The basic characteristics of these markets appear in Fig.1 below. There is significant interest in the future role of capacity markets in regions that do not currently have them. One example is ERCOT [16] . FERC recently held a technical workshop on Centralized Capacity Markets, [17] which explored and discussed the emerging impact of VG on prices and the potential need for capacity markets.
C. Locational marginal pricing
Variable generation is often located in remote areas which have poor access to the transmission network and so as renewable generation penetration increases these geographic issues will have more bearing on generation curtailment and electricity prices. Locational marginal pricing (LMP) provides signals for the price of electricity generation at each node in the network which also incentivize efficient use of transmission assets. LMPs feature in many markets in the USA, eg, PJM, ERCOT, NYISO.
The European Target model, in contrast, envisages one price for each zone within the European market [11] , [18] . This requirement for one clearing price for each zone all but precludes locational marginal pricing within zones. This may lead to wrong price signals within a particular zone where transmission constraints which do not translate into a dynamic transmission price cause the scheduled dispatch to diverge from the 'optimal' dispatch in the case of no transmission constraints. In the Single Electricity Market of Ireland, for example, constraint payments are made to generators whose real time output as determined by the system operator differed from their scheduled output according to a market dispatch. Total constraint payments made in the years 2008-2012 have been as high as 7% of total system costs [19] . In the absence of a policy shift at European level in favour of including a location aspect to electricity pricing it is unlikely that renewable generation can or will be located in an efficient manner in European systems [20] .
IV. FUTURE MARKET STRUCTURES
Efficient integration of renewable electricity requires markets that are capable of addressing the specific issues which arise as a result of increased variable generation. These include the procurement of sufficient flexibility and capacity. Capacity typically involves fixed costs only and so may be best procured by means of a fixed payment mechanism. Flexibility has both fixed and variable costs and so separate mechanisms are required to procure flexibility both in the short-term and the long-term.
A. Short-term procurement of flexibility
Short term flexibility could be incentivized through efficient reserve pricing mechanisms. In particular, a reserve pricing mechanism which renders the unit owner indifferent between energy and reserve provision will incentivize the unit to declare its full flexibility in gross pool markets. Inefficient pricing of reserve could lead to generation units either not declaring their full flexibility or entering long term bilateral contracts with a supply company and limiting the range of their capabilities available to the system operator.
At higher shares of variable generation it will become increasingly important to allow variable generation to participate in reserve provision. Variable generation can provide upward reserve when it is dispatched down. During periods of power surplus, some conventional power plants remain online just to provide reserves. By using surplus variable generation for reserve provision, conventional units can be shut down, reducing fuel consumption and operational costs. Wind generators can also increase their revenues by acquiring reserve payments as well as energy payments [21] .
If variable generation is allowed to participate in reserve products, it may become beneficial to utilize longer gate closures for reserve products when variable generation is forecasted to be low and shorter gate closures when variable generation is forecasted to be high. Variable generation has considerable uncertainty, which decreases with forecast horizon. Moving gate closure of the reserve products close to real time will decrease energy losses. The trade-off is not to forego cost-effective conventional units by using too short gate closure. One option is to use a combination of longer and shorter gate closures, like some frequency control reserves are currently procured in Finland [22] .
Uncertainty in demand and generation output levels may lead to a situation where efficient reserve pricing cannot provide the correct long and short term signals [23] . While stochastic techniques can be used to arrive at an efficient dispatch system operators have shown a reluctance to rely on these tools without sufficient time to test them. This may lead instead to the specific design of products or payments which reward flexibility [24] .
B. Long-term procurement of flexibility
The procurement of flexibility long term relates to the capabilities of the units. As both the build times and the life times of generation capacity are significant there is a premium on certainty and fixed payments for specific flexible capabilities may be useful. Determining the value of flexible characteristics of generators is a challenge, however, particularly over the long term as the value of the flexibility of a particular unit will depend on the capabilities of all other units on the system. Some possible solutions include procurement of system services by system operators using periodic auctions. This means the value of flexible capabilities need not be calculated directly. Determining the timeframe of such auctions is important. A short time frame may not enable all possible entrants to participate. A longer time frame however may lock a system operator into paying for capabilities which were not required if the generation portfolio did not evolve as expected.
C. Long-term procurement of capacity
The design of efficient capacity payment mechanisms is nontrivial. Alternatives could include longterm capacity procurement contracts entered into by system operators, in a similar manner to longterm flexibility procurement. However such longterm agreements can be costly if the underlying assumptions do not play out as expected.
Energy only markets could in principle provide price signals to invest in capacity, if marginal units are allowed to bid in high prices taking into account that they need to cover fixed costs with lower operating hours. This would mean electricity prices would at times be very high and very low. This would incentivize demand side flexibility, and at least lower the demand for extra capacity payments.
D. Interaction between flexibility and capacity procurement
A good market design principle is to have a separate product for each requirement in the power system. When a single unit can cater for several needs, it follows that the separate products need to be procured simultaneously for optimality. For example, if capacity is acquired with an auction, the auctioneer needs to also consider how much flexibility at different time scales will be required in the future power system and how the auction will reward the flexibility in addition to capacity. This becomes a considerable planning task and may be difficult to implement without distortions. Alternatives at opposite sides of the spectrum are 1) short-term markets only with sufficient rewards for short-term flexibility and 2) monopoly on the asset ownership. The former would require contract markets to enable long-term investments.
As risks and uncertainties in electricity generation are significant it may be that there is an incentive on behalf of generators to enter into longterm bilateral contracts with suppliers. This limits the ability of system operators to utilize the full range of flexibility from generators. Thus a welldesigned capacity payment mechanism may reduce uncertainty to generators and increase their incentive to declare shortterm flexibility. Alternatively stochastic optimization of the system may result in efficient price signals which may reduce the need for flexibility payments but will do little to incentivize capacity investment.
A hybrid mechanism which considers unit capability and so enables longterm procurement of both flexibility and capacity may prove desirable. However it is important to note that if such a mechanism can be designed to provide efficient investment signals then energy and reserve pricing should be limited to ensuring efficient operational signals are provided as to avoid double-counting and potential market distortion.
There is significant interest in the U.S. regarding (a) the effectiveness of the existing capacity markets, (b) whether other market areas need capacity markets, given the suppression of prices with high levels of wind/solar energy, and (c) whether long-term capacity markets should include tranches of different flexibility characteristics, whether flexibility and capacity markets should be separate, or whether they should be somehow linked -and if so, how. In Europe, the IEM in principle allows different systems to put their own mechanisms in place for procurement of system services such as flexibility. However systems which do not include a capacity payment are expected to trade with systems which do, and if the first moves towards an equilibrium whereby price is driven by longrun marginal costs and the latter by shortrun marginal costs this may lead to systematic differentials in price. This may cause inefficient interconnector operation such as between Finland, which is energy-only for the most part, and Russia, where capacity payments form a large portion of the total generator revenue.
V. TESTING FUTURE MARKET DESIGNS
Testing new market designs is an evolving area of research. As an example, markets in the U.S. are still changing, as new ancillary service markets are under consideration and as the role of capacity markets is receiving attention from transmission operators and the FERC. Capacity market definitions and structures have changed over the years -in New England, for example, the initial capacity market design did not elicit sufficient forward capacity, and redesigns were necessary [14] .
In our view, modeling may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to ensure that markets will perform as desired. Alternative approaches to help establish market designs include x production/market simulation x agent-based market simulation x analyses of market incentives and potential unintended consequences x market implementation and evolution Many production/market models are linearized approximations of reality and thus may not adequately represent the actual operation of markets. This type of market may underestimate the role of agents who wish to maximize profit, and may also use market characterizations of perfect competition for markets that may more closely resemble monopolistic competition and/or oligopoly. Agent-based simulations can sometimes overcome these limitations, but may not fully and correctly specify the objective functions of agents. A more abstract analysis of markets and incentives may reveal unintended consequences of market designs. One example is the design of energy markets in much of the U.S. that ignores the importance of frequency response. These markets provide economic dis-incentives for generators to provide frequency response because of the structure of the energy markets [24] . Thus, all of the aforementioned approaches, and possibly others, are needed to ensure the proper performance of markets for capacity, flexibility, energy, and ancillary services.
VI. CONCLUSION
Electricity market evolution is complex and slow moving. Energy-only markets are in many cases being replaced by a combination of energy, ancillary service and capacity markets but the interactions between these markets are nontrivial and difficult to predict or model. Capacity markets are attracting interest from the FERC in the USA. In Europe ACER is openly dubious about the need for capacity remuneration and is concerned about the impact on price signals and trade. Incentivizing capacity without consideration for capability is unlikely to lead to sufficient flexible generation investment and specific incentives for flexible investment and operation may be required. While there is certainly a connection between forward capacity markets and flexibility, the specific market mechanisms which will lead to both the required longterm capacity and flexibility are as yet unclear.
